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Undue	  Process	  at	  the	  FDA	  	  Lisa	  Heinzerling*	  	  	  I.	  	  Introduction	  	  	   Students	   of	   administrative	   law	   have,	   sadly,	   grown	   accustomed	   to	   agency	  proceedings	  that	  seem	  to	  last	  forever.	  	  Even	  in	  the	  ossified	  world	  of	  agency	  decision	  making,	   however,	   the	   pace	   of	   the	   Food	   and	   Drug	   Administration	   (FDA)	   in	  addressing	  the	  routine	  administration	  of	  antibiotics	  to	  animals	  destined	  for	  the	  food	  supply	  stands	  apart.	   	  For	  over	  40	  years,	   the	  FDA	  has	  been	  collecting	  evidence	  that	  this	   agricultural	   practice	   contributes	   to	   the	   development	   of	   antibiotic-­‐resistant	  infections	   in	   the	   human	   population.1	   	   Based	   on	   such	   evidence,	   in	   fact,	   the	   agency	  officially	  proposed	   to	  withdraw	  prior	  approvals	   for	   two	  antibiotics	  used	   in	  animal	  feed	  and	  offered	  to	  hold	  hearings	  on	  its	  proposal.2	  	  That	  was	  over	  35	  years	  ago,	  yet	  no	  hearings	  have	  commenced.	  	  	   In	  a	  mark	  of	  dubious	  progress,	  the	  FDA	  has	  now	  officially	  announced	  that	  it	  does	   not	   intend	   to	   pursue	   the	   long-­‐promised	   hearings.	   	   In	   late	   2011,	   the	   agency	  denied	  two	  citizen	  petitions	  asking	  it	  to	  withdraw	  approvals	  for	  certain	  antibiotics	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	   Professor	   of	   Law,	   Georgetown	   University	   Law	   Center.	   	   I	   am	   grateful	   to	   Molly	  Murphy	  and	  Nicole	  Smith	  for	  excellent	  research	  assistance.	  1	  Tetracycline	  (Chlortetracycline	  and	  Oxytetracycline)-­‐Containing	  Premixes,	  42	  Fed.	  Reg.	   56,264,	   56,266	   (Oct.	   21,	   1977).	   	   See	   also,	   e.g.,	   U.K.,	   Report	   of	   the	   Joint	  Committee	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  Antibiotics	  in	  Animal	  Husbandry	  and	  Veterinary	  Medicine	  (1969)	   (known	  as	   the	   “Swann	  Report,”	   after	   the	  head	  of	   the	   committee,	  Dr.	  M.	  M.	  Swann).	  2	  Tetracycline	  (Chlortetracycline	  and	  Oxytetracycline)-­‐Containing	  Premixes,	  42	  Fed.	  Reg.	  56,264,	  56,265	  (Oct.	  21,	  1977).	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used	   in	   animal	   feed3	   and	   also	   formally	   withdrew	   the	   decades-­‐old	   notices	  announcing	  public	  hearings.4	  	  In	  both	  contexts,	  the	  FDA	  explained	  -­‐-­‐	  without	  a	  trace	  of	  irony	  -­‐-­‐	  that	  the	  process	  for	  withdrawing	  these	  approvals	  would	  simply	  take	  too	  
long	  and	  that	  the	  agency	  was	  thus	  instead	  encouraging	  the	  animal	  feed	  industry	  to	  take	  voluntary	  measures	  to	  address	  the	  overuse	  of	  antibiotics.5	  	  The	  reason	  why	  the	  FDA	  believed	  the	  process	  for	  withdrawing	  approvals	  would	  take	  too	  long	  is	  that	  the	  agency	   thought	   itself	   legally	   bound	   to	   offer	   formal,	   trial-­‐type,	   procedurally	  maximalist	   hearings	   on	   the	   question	  whether	   the	   relevant	   antibiotics	  were	   "safe"	  within	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   relevant	   statute,	   the	   Food,	   Drug	   and	   Cosmetic	   Act	  (FDCA).6	  	   A	   district	   court	   has	   rejected	   both	   of	   the	   FDA’s	   decisions.	   	   In	   complex	   but	  compelling	   rulings,	   a	   magistrate	   judge	   held	   that	   the	   FDA	   was	   obliged	   to	   move	  forward	  with	  hearings	  on	   the	  safety	  of	   the	  routine	  administration	  of	  antibiotics	   to	  animals	  destined	  for	  the	  human	  food	  supply.7	  	  The	  magistrate	  judge	  concluded	  that,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   Letter	   from	   Lesley	   Kux,	   FDA,	   to	   Sarah	   Klein,	   Center	   for	   Science	   in	   the	   Public	  Interest,	  Original	  Docket	  No.	  99G-­‐0485/CP,	  New	  Docket	  No.	  FDA-­‐1999-­‐P-­‐1286	  (Nov.	  7,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-­‐1999-­‐P-­‐1286-­‐0009	   ("CSPI	   Denial	   Letter");	   Letter	   from	   Lesley	   Kux,	   FDA,	   to	   Andrew	  Maguire,	   Environmental	   Defense	   Fund,	   Original	   Docket	   No.	   05P-­‐0139/CP,	   New	  Docket	   No.	   FDA-­‐2005-­‐P-­‐0007	   (Nov.	   7,	   2011),	   available	   at	  http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-­‐2005-­‐P-­‐0007-­‐0007	   ("EDF	  Denial	  Letter").	  4	  Withdrawal	   of	   Notices	   of	   Opportunity	   for	   a	   Hearing;	   Penicillin	   and	   Tetracycline	  Used	   in	   Animal	   Feed,	   76	   Fed.	   Reg.	   246	   (Dec.	   22,	   2011)	   ("FDA	   Withdrawal	   of	  Notices").	  5	  CSPI	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  3-­‐4;	  EDF	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  3-­‐4;	  FDA	  Withdrawal	  of	  Notices	  at	  79700	  &	  n.	  8.	  6	  CSPI	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  EDF	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  FDA	  Withdrawal	  of	  Notices,	  76	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  79700	  n.	  8.	  7	   NRDC	   v.	   FDA,	   2012	  US	  Dist.	   LEXIS	   77384	   (June	   11,	   2012)	   (“NRDC	   II”);	   NRDC	   v.	  FDA,	  2012	  US	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  39457	  (Mar.	  22,	  2012)	  (“NRDC	  I”).	  	  See	  also	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA,	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with	  respect	  to	  two	  antibiotics,	  penicillin	  and	  tetracycline,	  the	  FDA	  had	  already	  -­‐-­‐	  in	  1977	  and	  beyond	   -­‐-­‐	   found	   that	   routinely	  administering	   these	  drugs	   to	  animals	   for	  the	   purposes	   of	   promoting	   growth	   and	   preventing	   infection	  was	   not	   safe.8	   	  With	  respect	   to	   other	   antibiotics	   covered	   by	   the	   citizen	   petitions,	   the	   judge	   concluded	  that	   the	   agency	   must	   initiate	   withdrawal	   proceedings	   because	   its	   reasons	   for	  refusing	  to	  do	  so	  were	  arbitrary	  and	  capricious.9	  	  These	  rulings	  are	  now	  on	  appeal	  in	  the	  Second	  Circuit.	  	   Perhaps	   surprisingly,	   the	   core	   legal	   premise	   of	   the	   FDA's	   decisions	   -­‐-­‐	   its	  belief	   that	   it	   was	   legally	   obligated	   to	   hold	   formal	   hearings	   in	   the	   circumstances	  presented	   -­‐-­‐	   has	   not	   been	   addressed,	   or	   even	   challenged,	   in	   the	   current	   legal	  proceedings.10	  	  In	  this	  article,	  I	  explain	  that	  this	  core	  legal	  premise	  is	  mistaken.	  	  The	  FDA	   is	   not	   required	   to	   hold	   formal	   evidentiary	   hearings	   on	   the	   question	  whether	  approvals	   for	   certain	   antibiotics	   should	   be	   withdrawn	   because	   the	   drugs	   are	   not	  "safe"	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  FDCA.	  	  Without	  this	  premise,	  the	  FDA's	  decision	  to	  leave	  this	  problem	  to	  the	  industry	  that	  created	  it	  cannot	  stand.	  	   More	  broadly,	  beyond	  its	  mistaken	  legal	  judgment,	  the	  FDA's	  inertness	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed	  also	  reflects	  several	  pervasive	  problems	  in	  the	  modern	  administrative	  state.	  	  I	  do	  not	  discuss	  these	  problems	  in	  detail	  in	  this	  paper,	  but,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  they	  include	  institutional	  memory	  that	  does	  not	  adjust	  to	  changed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2012	  US	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  12486	  (Aug.	  8,	  2012)	  (setting	  schedule	  for	  FDA	  compliance	  with	  previous	  orders).	  8	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA,	  2012	  US	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  39457	  (Mar.	  22,	  2012).	  9	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA,	  2012	  US	  Dist.	  LEXIS	  77384	  (June	  11,	  2012).	  10	   The	   magistrate	   judge	   assumed,	   without	   discussion,	   that	   a	   “public	   evidentiary	  hearing”	  was	  required,	   if	   requested,	  before	   the	  FDA	  could	  withdraw	  approvals	   for	  animal	  drugs.	   	  NRDC	  I,	  at	  23	  (slip	  opinion);	  see	  also	  NRDC	  II,	  at	  33	  (citing	  need	  for	  “formal	  proceeding”).	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circumstances;	   system-­‐wide	   acceptance	   of	   indefinite	   delay	   in	   agency	   decision	  making;	   and	   statutory	   grants	   of	   epistemic	   authority	   to	   specific	   individuals	  within	  large	   regulatory	   institutions.	   	   Together,	   these	   problems	   conspire	   against	   what	   I	  think	   of	   as	   "moments	   of	   truth"	   in	   administrative	   law:	   moments	   when	   an	  administrative	   agency	   must	   confront	   the	   evidence	   it	   holds	   concerning	   a	   social	  problem	  it	  is	  charged	  with	  addressing,	  and	  speak	  the	  truth,	  as	  best	  it	  can,	  about	  it.	  	   	  Before	   turning	   to	   the	   legal	   error	   underlying	   the	   FDA's	   immobility	   on	  antibiotics	   in	   animal	   feed	   and,	   briefly,	   to	   broader	   issues	   in	   administrative	   law	  reflected	   in	   the	   FDA's	   inaction,	   I	   first	   review	   the	   regulatory	   history	   of	   the	   use	   of	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed.	  II.	  	  Antibiotics,	  Animal	  Feed,	  and	  the	  FDA	  	   During	  World	  War	   II,	   the	  United	  States	  government	  worked	  collaboratively	  with	   drug	   companies	   to	   develop,	   test,	   and	   make	   commercially	   available	   the	  antibiotics	   that	  were	   to	   become	   the	  wonder	  drugs	   of	   twentieth-­‐century	  medicine.	  	  Following	  Congress’s	  then-­‐recent	   instruction	  to	  the	  FDA11	  to	  evaluate	  the	  safety	  of	  drugs	   before	   allowing	   them	   on	   the	   market,12	   the	   agency	   processed	   numerous	  approvals	  for	  penicillin-­‐based	  drugs,	  used	  for	  both	  humans	  and	  animals,	  during	  the	  1940s.	  	  In	  1945,	  concerned	  that	  the	  manufacturing	  process	  for	  penicillin	  and	  drugs	  derived	   from	  penicillin	   did	   not	   produce	   drugs	   of	   consistent	   strength,	   quality,	   and	  purity,	  Congress	  passed	  a	   law	  requiring	   the	  FDA	   to	   issue	   regulations	  ensuring	   the	  	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  of	   these	  drugs	  and	   to	  certify	   that	  batches	  of	  penicillin	  destined	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	   The	   FDA's	   responsibilities	   were	   at	   that	   time	   lodged	   in	   the	   Federal	   Security	  Administration.	  12	  Food,	  Drug	  and	  Cosmetic	  Act	  of	  1938,	  c.	  675,	  52	  Stat.	  1040.	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for	   the	  market	  met	   the	   agency's	   requirements.13	   	  At	   the	   same	   time,	  Congress	   also	  gave	   the	   FDA	   the	   authority	   to	  waive	   these	   requirements	   if	   it	   found	   that	   doing	   so	  would	  be	  safe.14	  	   This	  waiver	  authority	   is	  how	  the	  FDA	  came	   to	  approve	  antibiotics	  used	   for	  purposes	   other	   than	   treating	   active	   infections	   in	   animals	   destined	   for	   the	   human	  food	  supply.	  	  Soon	  after	  they	  began	  to	  administer	  antibiotics	  to	  food	  animals	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  treating	  infections,	  farmers	  discovered	  that	  –	  for	  reasons	  unknown	  –	  the	  antibiotics	   promoted	   growth	   in	   these	   animals.15	   	   In	   1951,	   the	   FDA	   waived	   the	  requirements	   of	   batch	   certification	   for	   certain	   antibiotics	   used	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  promoting	   growth	   in	   food	   animals.16	   	   Then,	   in	   1953,	   the	   agency	   waived	   these	  requirements	   for	   antibiotics	   used	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   preventing	   -­‐-­‐	   rather	   than	  treating	  –	  certain	  infections	  in	  these	  animals.17	   	  The	  waivers	  in	  both	  contexts	  were	  conditioned	  on	  the	  supplement	  or	  feed,	  used	  to	  deliver	  the	  antibiotics,	  containing	  a	  denaturant	  making	   it	   unfit	   for	   human	   use.18	   	   The	   head	   of	   the	   agency	   issued	   both	  waivers	  without	   any	   public	   process,	   explaining:	   “Notice	   and	   public	   procedure	   are	  not	  necessary	  prerequisites	  to	  the	  promulgation	  of	  this	  order,	  and	  I	  so	  find,	  since	  it	  was	  drawn	  in	  collaboration	  with	  interested	  members	  of	  the	  affected	  industries	  and	  since	  it	  would	  be	  against	  public	  interest	  to	  delay	  …”19	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Penicillin	  Amendment	  of	  1945,	  ch.	  281,	  §	  3,	  59	  Stat.	  463.	  	  	  14	  Id.	  15	   Tetracycline	   (Chlortetracycline	   and	   Oxytetracycline)-­‐Containing	   Premixes,	   42	  Fed.	  Reg.	  56,264,	  56,265	  (Oct.	  21,	  1977).	  16	  16	  Fed.	  Reg.	  3647	  (Apr.	  28,	  1951).	  17	  18	  Fed.	  Reg.	  2335	  (Apr.	  22,	  1953).	  18	  16	  Fed.	  Reg.	  3647	  (Apr.	  28,	  1951);	  18	  Fed.	  Reg.	  2335	  (Apr.	  22,	  1953).	  	  19	  16	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  3618;	  see	  also	  18	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  2336	  (same).	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   In	   this	   understated	   fashion,	   the	   FDA	   approved	   what	   was	   to	   become	   the	  largest	  use	  of	  antibiotics	  in	  this	  country.	  	  Today,	  some	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  antibiotics	  used	  in	  the	  United	  States	  are	  given,	  not	  to	  humans,	  but	  to	  animals	  destined	  for	  the	  human	   food	   supply.20	   	   The	   great	   majority	   of	   these	   antibiotics	   are	   given	   to	   the	  animals,	  not	  to	  treat	  active	  infections,	  but	  to	  promote	  animal	  growth	  and	  to	  prevent	  infections	  in	  the	  microbe-­‐rich	  environment	  of	  the	  factory	  farm.21	  	  	  The	   FDCA	   requires	   the	   FDA	   to	  withdraw	  approvals	   for	   animal	   drugs	  when	  new	  evidence	   emerges,	   indicating	   that	   the	  drugs	   are	  not	   safe.22	   	  Only	   a	   few	  years	  after	  the	  FDA	  had	  approved	  using	  antibiotics	  for	  purposes	  of	  promoting	  growth	  and	  preventing	  infection	  in	  food	  animals,	  the	  agency	  began	  accumulating	  evidence	  that	  this	  practice	  contributed	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  antibiotic-­‐resistant	  microbes	  and	  to	  the	  development	  of	  antibiotic-­‐resistant	  infections	  in	  the	  human	  population.23	   	   In	  1973,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  Ralph	  Loglisci,	  New	  Numbers	  Reveal	  Food	  Animals	  Consume	  Lion’s	  Share	  of	  Antibiotics	   (Dec.	   23,	   2010),	   available	   at	  http://www.livablefutureblog.com/2010/12/new-­‐fda-­‐numbers-­‐reveal-­‐food-­‐animals-­‐consume-­‐lion’s-­‐share-­‐of-­‐antibiotics	   (citing	   FDA,	   Summary	   Report	   on	  Antimicrobials	   Sold	   or	   Distributed	   for	   Use	   in	   Food-­‐Producing	   Animals	   (2009),	  available	   at	  http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees/AnimalDrugUserFeeActADUFA/UCM231851.pdf).	  	  21	  Precise	  numbers	  are	  hard	  to	  come	  by,	  as	  information	  available	  from	  the	  FDA	  does	  not	   provide	   separate	   estimates	   for	   the	   amount	   of	   antibiotics	   used	   to	   promote	  growth	   and	   prevent	   infection.	   	   But	   informed	   estimates	   suggest	   that	   a	   sizeable	  majority	   of	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   antibiotics	   given	   to	   farm	   animals	   is	   for	   these	  purposes,	  and	  not	  to	  treat	  active	  infection.	  	  See,	  e.g.,	  Union	  of	  Concerned	  Scientists,	  Hogging	   It!:	   Estimates	   of	   Antimicrobial	   Abuse	   in	   Livestock	   (2001),	   available	   at	  http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/food_and_agriculture/hog_front.pdf.	  22	  21	  U.S.C.	  360b(e)(1)(B).	  23	   Tetracycline	   (Chlortetracycline	   and	   Oxytetracycline)-­‐Containing	   Premixes,	   42	  Fed.	   Reg.	   56,264,	   56,266	   (Oct.	   21,	   1977).	   	   See	   also,	   e.g.,	   U.K.,	   Report	   of	   the	   Joint	  Committee	  on	  the	  Use	  of	  Antibiotics	  in	  Animal	  Husbandry	  and	  Veterinary	  Medicine	  (1969)	   (known	  as	   the	   “Swann	  Report,”	   after	   the	  head	  of	   the	   committee,	  Dr.	  M.	  M.	  Swann).	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armed	  with	   the	  emerging	  evidence	  on	   the	   link	  between	  antibiotics	  used	   in	  animal	  feed	  and	  antibiotic	  resistance	  in	  humans,	  the	  agency	  published	  a	  rule	  in	  the	  Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations,	  directing	  drug	  companies	  to	  come	  forward	  with	  evidence	  that	  their	   use	   of	   antibiotics	   in	   food	   animals	   for	   "subtherapeutic"	   purposes	   was	   safe	  within	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  FDCA	  and	  serving	  notice	   that	   their	  approvals	  would	  be	  withdrawn	   if	   they	   did	   not	   present	   such	   evidence.24	   	   The	   agency	   defined	  "subtherapeutic"	   uses	   to	   include	   the	   promotion	   of	   growth	   and	   the	   prevention	   of	  infection.25	  	  In	  1977,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  evidence	  linking	  these	  uses	  to	  the	  development	  of	   antibiotic-­‐resistant	   infections	   in	   humans,	   the	   FDA	   announced	   that	   it	   was	  proposing	  to	  withdraw	  its	  approval	  for	  the	  use	  of	  penicillin	  and	  tetracycline	  in	  food	  animals	   for	  purposes	  other	  than	  treating	  active	   infections	  and	  stated	  that	   it	  would	  hold	   a	   public	   hearing	   on	   the	   proposed	   withdrawals.26	   	   This	   hearing	   notice	   was	  withdrawn	   in	   2011,	   when	   the	   FDA	   explained	   that	   the	   formal	   hearings	   it	   thought	  required	   by	   the	   FDCA	  would	   take	   too	   long	   and	   that	   the	   agency	   therefore	   thought	  voluntary	  measures	  by	  the	  animal	  feed	  industry	  were	  a	  better	  idea.	  	  	  It	   bears	   emphasizing	   that	   FDA,	   thus,	   approved	   using	   antibiotics	   for	  subtherapeutic	   purposes	   without	   holding	   a	   hearing,	   but	   has	   refused	   to	   consider	  withdrawing	  these	  approvals	  because	  it	  would	  need	  to	  hold	  a	  hearing.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Antibiotics	  and	  Sulfanamid	  Drugs	  in	  the	  Feed	  of	  Animals,	  38	  Fed.	  Reg.	  9,811,	  9,813	  (codified	  at	  former	  21	  C.F.R.	  §	  135.109;	  renumbered	  at	  21	  C.F.R.	  §	  558.15).	  25	  Id.	  at	  9,813.	  See	  also	  Tetracycline,	  42	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  56,255	  (“subtherapeutic”	  means	  “lower	  levels	  than	  therapeutic	  levels	  needed	  to	  cure	  disease”)	  (emphasis	  added).	  26	   Penicillin-­‐Containing	   Premixes,	   42	   Fed.	   Reg.	   43,772,	   43,792	   (Aug.	   30,	   1977);	  Tetracycline	   (Chlortetracycline	   and	  Oxytetracycline)-­‐Containing	   Premixes,	   42	   Fed.	  Reg.	  56,264,	  56,288	  (Oct.	  21,	  1977).	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In	   the	   decades	   between	   the	   FDA's	   1977	   notices	   of	   hearing	   and	   its	   2011	  withdrawal	   of	   those	   notices,	   the	   agency	   continued	   to	   accumulate	   evidence	   of	   the	  link	  between	  administering	  subtherapeutic	  doses	  of	  antibiotics	  to	  food	  animals	  and	  the	   development	   of	   antibiotic-­‐resistant	   infections	   in	   the	   human	   population.27	  Indeed,	   the	  FDA	   itself	   repeatedly	  acknowledged	   the	   link	  between	  herd-­‐	  and	   flock-­‐wide	   administration	   of	   antibiotics	   to	   food	   animals	   and	   the	   development	   of	  antibiotic-­‐resistant	   disease	   in	   humans.28	   	   Nevertheless,	   even	   before	   its	   official	  withdrawal	   of	   the	   1977	   hearing	   notices	   and	   embrace	   of	   voluntary	  measures,	   the	  agency	  had	  mostly	  relied	  on	  voluntary	  efforts	  by	  the	  animal	  feed	  industry	  to	  address	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  physical	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  use	  of	  antibiotics	   in	  animal	  feed	   can	   cause	   the	   development	   of	   antibiotic-­‐resistant	   disease	   in	   humans	   and	   the	  scientific	  evidence	  that	  such	  mechanisms	  are	  indeed	  producing	  antibiotic-­‐resistant	  strains	   of	   microbes	   in	   the	   human	   population,	   see,	   e.g.,	   Meghan	   F.	   Davis	   &	   Lainie	  Rutkow,	  Regulatory Strategies To Combat Antimicrobial Resistance of Animal Origin: 
Recommendations for a Science-Based U.S. Approach, 25 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 327 (2012); Vanessa	  K.S.	  Briceno,	  Superbug	  Me:	  The	  FDA's	  Role	   in	   the	  Fight	  Against	  Antibiotic	  Resistance,	   9	   NYU	   J.	   Legis.	   &	   Pub.	   Pol'y	   521	   (2005/06);	   Ariele	   Lessing,	   Killing	   Us	  Softly:	  How	  Sub-­‐therapeutic	  Dosing	  of	  Livestock	  Causes	  Drug-­‐Resistant	  Bacteria	   in	  Humans,	  37	  B.C.	  Envtl.	  Aff.	  L.	  Rev.	  463	  (2010);	  Robyn L. Goforth & Carol R. Goforth, 
Appropriate Regulation of Antibiotics in Livestock Feed, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 39 
(2000).	  28	   See,	   e.g.,	   Testimony	   of	   Joshua	  M.	   Sharfstein,	   Principal	   Deputy	   Commissioner	   of	  Food	  and	  Drugs,	  Hearing	  on	  Preservation	  of	  Antibiotics	  for	  Medical	  Treatment	  Act	  of	  2009,	  Before	  the	  House	  Committee	  on	  Rules	  (July	  13,	  2009);	  ("Antimicrobial	  use	  in	  animals	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  resistant	  microorganisms	  that	  can	  infect	  people.	  	  The	  inappropriate	  nontherapeutic	  use	  of	  antimicrobial	  drugs	  of	   human	   importance	   in	   food-­‐producing	   animals	   is	   of	   particular	   concern.");	   FDA,	  Guidance	  for	  Industry	  #209,	  The	  Judicious	  Use	  of	  Medically	  Important	  Antimicrobial	  Drugs	   in	  Food-­‐Producing	  Animals,	  at	  17	  (April	  13,	  2012)	  ("FDA	  has	  considered	  all	  available	   information	   [on	   "the	   public	   health	   concerns	   associated	   with	   the	   use	   of	  medically	   important	  antimicrobial	  drugs	   in	   food-­‐producing	  animals"]	  and	  believes	  that	  the	  weight	  of	  scientific	  evidence	  supports	  the	  recommendations	  outlined	  in	  this	  guidance	  document,"	  which	  were	  to	  achieve	  the	   judicious	  use	  of	  such	  drugs);	  CSPI	  Denial	   Letter	   at	   1	   ("we	   share	   your	   concern	   about	   the	   use	   of	  medically	   important	  antimicrobial	   drugs	   in	   food-­‐producing	   animals	   for	   growth	   promotion	   and	   feed	  efficiency"),	   4	   (embracing	   goal	   of	   "judicious	   use	   of	   medically-­‐important	  antimicrobials");	  EDF	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  1,4	  (same).	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the	  problem	  of	   overuse	  of	   antibiotics	   for	   food	  animals.	   	   The	   agency	  did	   engage	   in	  more	   direct	   action	   in	   one	   instance,	   by	   withdrawing	   approval	   for	   the	   use	   of	  enrofloxacin	   in	   poultry.29	   	   In	   that	   case,	   the	   proceedings	   for	   withdrawing	   the	  approval	   stretched	   on	   for	   five	   years	   -­‐-­‐	   a	   fact	   emphasized	   by	   the	   FDA	   in	   2011	   in	  declining	  to	  take	  on	  that	  procedural	  burden	  again.30	  	  But,	  as	  I	  next	  explain,	  the	  FDA	  is	   mistaken	   in	   believing	   that	   it	   must	   offer	   formal	   evidentiary	   hearings	   before	  withdrawing	  approvals	  for	  animal	  drugs.	  III.	  	  The	  Legal	  Case	  Against	  Formal	  Hearings	  	   In	  refusing	  to	  initiate	  regulatory	  action	  on	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed,	  the	  FDA	  stated	  that	  formal	  evidentiary	  hearings	  would	  be	  required	  before	  the	  agency	  could	  withdraw	  any	  approvals	  for	  these	  antibiotics.31	  	  The	  agency	  explained	  in	  some	  detail	  how	  such	  procedurally	  intensive	  hearings	  would	  drain	  time	  and	  resources	  from	  the	  agency,	  and	  why	  the	  agency	   thought	   its	   time	  and	  resources	  would	  be	  better	  spent	  pursuing	   voluntary	   efforts	   by	   the	   animal	   feed	   industry.32	   	   The	   agency	   did	   not,	  however,	  explain	  why	  it	  thought	  itself	  legally	  required	  to	  hold	  such	  formal	  hearings	  in	  the	  first	  place.	   	  Strikingly,	  the	  agency	  simply	  asserted	  the	  point,	  without	  citation	  to	   any	   source,	   legal	   or	   otherwise.33	   	   In	   a	   previous	   decision	   on	   the	   same	   subject,	  however,	  the	  agency	  had	  explained	  that	  it	  was	  “required	  by	  statute”	  to	  hold	  a	  formal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	   FDA	   Commissioner,	   Final	   Decision	   on	   Enrofloxacin,	   available	   at	  http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-­‐2000-­‐N-­‐0109-­‐0137.	  30	  CSPI	  Denial	  Letter,	  at	  3;	  EDF	  Denial	  Letter,	  at	  3.	  31	  CSPI	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  EDF	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  FDA	  Withdrawal	  of	  Notices,	  76	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  79699,	  79700	  n	  8.	  32	  CSPI	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  EDF	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  FDA	  Withdrawal	  of	  Notices,	  76	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  79699,	  79700	  &	  n.8.	  33	  CSPI	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  EDF	  Denial	  Letter	  at	  2;	  FDA	  Withdrawal	  of	  Notices,	  76	  Fed.	  Reg.	  at	  79700	  n.	  8.	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evidentiary	   hearing	   before	   withdrawing	   an	   approval	   for	   a	   new	   drug,	   and	   cited	  section	  512(e)(1)	  of	  the	  FDCA	  -­‐-­‐	  which	  merely	  requires	  "notice	  and	  opportunity	  for	  hearing"	   on	   such	   withdrawals34	   -­‐-­‐	   in	   support	   of	   the	   proposition	   that	   a	   “formal	  administrative	  hearing”	  was	  required.35	  	  As	  I	  argue	  here,	  however,	  developments	  in	  administrative	   law	   over	   the	   past	   several	   decades	   have	   dramatically	   relaxed	   legal	  requirements	   for	   formal	   agency	   proceedings.	   	   Moreover,	   nothing	   in	   the	   FDCA	  requires	  FDA	  to	   ignore	  these	  developments	  and	  cling	  to	   formal	  processes,	  and	  the	  FDA’s	  own	  regulations	  give	   it	   the	  discretion	   to	  decline	   formal	  hearings	  when	   they	  are	  not	  statutorily	  required.	  	  Nor	  could	  the	  FDA	  non-­‐arbitrarily	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  better	  to	  use	  more	  formal	  processes	  when	  informal	  ones	  would	  serve.	  	  	  A.	  	  Administrative	  Law	  After	  the	  1950s	  	   Anyone	  with	  even	  a	  passing	  familiarity	  with	  developments	  in	  administrative	  law	  in	  the	  past	  several	  decades	  will	  find	  the	  FDA's	  legal	  stance	  at	  least	  curious.	  	  One	  of	   the	   standard	   -­‐-­‐	   and	   also	   true	   -­‐-­‐	   accounts	   of	   the	   profound	   changes	   in	   the	  administrative	  state	  during	  the	  last	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  holds	  that,	  during	  this	   period,	  many	   if	   not	  most	   agencies	  moved	   toward	   rulemaking	   and	   away	   from	  adjudication,36	  and	  toward	  informal	  processes	  and	  away	  from	  formal	  ones.37	  	  These	  shifts	   made	   the	   agency	   that	   chooses	   to	   set	   general	   policy	   through	   adjudication	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  21	  U.S.C.	  362b(e)(1).	  35	   FDA	   Tentative	   Response	   to	   CSPI	   Petition,	   at	   2	   (Feb.	   28,	   2001),	   available	   at	  http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Mar01/030201/let0006.pdf.	  36	   See,	   e.g.,	   Antonin	   Scalia,	   Vermont	   Yankee:	   the	   APA,	   the	   D.C.	   Circuit,	   and	   the	  Supreme	   Court,	   1978	   Sup.	   Ct.	   Rev.	   345,	   376;	   Alan	   Morrison,	   The	   Administrative	  Procedure	  Act:	  A	  Living	  and	  Responsive	  Law,	  72	  Va.	  L.	  Rev.	  253,	  256-­‐58	  (1986).	  37	   See,	   e.g.,	   Robert	  W.	   Hamilton,	   Procedures	   for	   the	   Adoption	   of	   Rules	   of	   General	  Applicability:	  The	  Need	  for	  Procedural	  Innovation	  in	  Administrative	  Rulemaking,	  60	  Calif.	  L.	  Rev.	  1276	  (1972).	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rather	   than	   rulemaking	   an	   odd	   bird,	   and	   the	   agency	   that	   chooses	   formal	   over	  informal	  processes	  the	  administrative	  equivalent	  of	  the	  dodo	  -­‐-­‐	  exotic,	  ungainly,	  of	  a	  different	  era.	  	   We	  will	  return	  to	  the	  FDA	  in	  a	  moment.	  	  But	  first,	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  trace	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  developments	  in	  administrative	  law	  just	  described.	  	   Faced	   with	   regulatory	   responsibilities	   of	   daunting	   complexity	   and	  numerosity,	  administrative	  agencies	  obligated	  to	  resolve	  individual	  matters	  through	  time-­‐	  and	  resource-­‐intensive	  formal	  adjudicatory	  hearings	  began,	  as	  far	  back	  as	  the	  1950s,	  to	  simplify	  their	  work	  by	  deciding	  central	  issues	  in	  advance	  through	  informal	  rulemaking.	  	  In	  an	  important	  early	  case,	  United	  States	  v.	  Storer	  Broadcasting	  Co.,	  the	  Supreme	   Court	   upheld	   the	   Federal	   Communications	   Commission’s	   decision	   to	  reduce,	  by	  rule,	  the	  number	  of	  television	  outlets	  a	  single	  licensee	  could	  control,	  thus	  preordaining	   the	   outcome	   of	   an	   adjudicatory	   proceeding	   in	   which	   a	   licensee	  exceeding	  the	  new	  limits	  was	  seeking	  yet	  another	  broadcast	  license.38	  	  Likewise,	  in	  
FPC	   v.	   Texaco,	   the	   Court	   affirmed	   a	   Federal	   Power	   Commission	   rule	   that	   set	   new	  conditions	  for	  granting	  certificates	  for	  gas	  pipelines	  –	  thus,	  again,	  obviating	  the	  need	  for	   individual,	   trial-­‐type	   adjudications.39	   	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   eventually	   even	  upheld	  rules	  that	  provided	  individual	  applicants	  for	  government	  licenses	  and	  other	  benefits	   little	   or	   no	   opportunity,	   in	   adjudicatory	   proceedings,	   to	   argue	   for	   an	  exception	   to	   the	  principles	  set	  out	   in	   the	  generally	  applicable	  rules.40	   	  The	  Court’s	  endorsement	  of	  agencies’	  growing	  shift	  from	  adjudication	  to	  rulemaking	  was	  echoed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  351	  U.S.	  192	  (1956).	  39	  377	  U.S.	  33	  (1964).	  40	  FCC	  v.	  WNCN	  Listeners	  Guild,	  450	  U.S.	  582	  (1981);	  Heckler	  v.	  Campbell,	  461	  U.S.	  458	  (1983).	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and	   extended	   by	   Congress	   in	   dozens	   of	   statutes	   passed	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	  giving	  agencies	  broad-­‐ranging	  authority	  to	  act	  through	  rules.41	  	   The	  shift	  from	  formal	  to	  informal	  procedures	  in	  agency	  decision	  making	  was	  also	  spurred	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  through	  decisions	  in	  the	  1970s	  easing	  and	  even	  undoing	  requirements	  for	  formal	  procedures.	   	  A	  huge	  turn	  came	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  
Florida	   East	   Coast	   Railway,42	   in	   which	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   an	   agency	   was	   not	  required	   to	   undertake	   formal	   rulemaking	   -­‐-­‐	   complete	  with	   trial-­‐type	   hearings43	   -­‐-­‐	  under	   the	   Administrative	   Procedure	   Act	   (APA)	   if	   its	   enabling	   statute	   merely	  required	  a	  "hearing"	  of	  an	  unspecified	  nature.44	  	  Because	  the	  statute	  at	  issue	  in	  that	  case,	   the	   Interstate	  Commerce	  Act,	   required	  only	  a	   "hearing,"	   the	  Court	  concluded	  that	   the	   Interstate	   Commerce	  Commission	  was	  within	   its	   rights	   in	   proceeding	   via	  informal	   rulemaking,	   and	   not	   via	   the	   formal	   rulemaking	   processes	   of	   the	   APA.45	  	  Although	  the	  Court	  insisted	  that	  the	  words	  of	  the	  APA	  -­‐-­‐	  "on	  the	  record"	  and	  "after	  ...	  hearing"	   -­‐-­‐	  were	  not	   "words	  of	   art"	   and	   that	   "statutory	   language	  having	   the	   same	  meaning"	  could	  trigger	  the	  APA's	  formal	  rulemaking	  requirements,46	  the	  fact	  is	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  See,	  e.g.,	  Clean	  Air	  Act,	  42	  U.S.C	  §§	  7401-­‐7642;	  Occupational	  Safety	  and	  Health	  Act,	  29	   U.S.C.	   §§	   651-­‐678;	   Consumer	   Product	   Safety	   Act,	   15	   U.S.C.	   §§	   2051-­‐2083;	  National	  Traffic	  and	  Motor	  Vehicle	  Safety	  Act,	  15	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1381-­‐1426.	  42	   410	   U.S.	   224	   (1973).	   	   The	   Court's	   decision	   in	   Florida	   East	   Coast	   Railway	   was	  presaged	   -­‐-­‐	   by	   the	   Court's	   lights,	   even	   controlled	   -­‐-­‐	   by	   its	   decision	   the	   preceding	  Term	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Allegheny-­‐Ludlum	  Steel	  Corp.,	  406	  U.S.	  742	  (1972).	  43	   Id.	  at	  238,	  nn.	  3	  and	  4	  (quoting	  procedural	   requirements	   for	   formal	  rulemaking	  and	  adjudication	  under	  APA).	  44	  Id.	  at	  238.	  45	  Id.	  at	  238.	  46	  Id.	  at	  238.	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no	   statute	   not	   using	   the	   words	   "on	   the	   record"	   has	   been	   held	   to	   require	   formal	  rulemaking	  under	  the	  APA	  since	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway.47	  	  	  	   The	   Court	   likewise	   held	   that	   the	   bare	   requirement	   of	   a	   "hearing"	   in	   the	  Interstate	  Commerce	  Act	  did	  not,	   standing	  alone	  and	  apart	   from	  the	  APA,	  obligate	  the	   ICC	  to	  offer	  a	  more	  elaborate	  process	   than	   it	  had	   in	   that	  case	   -­‐-­‐	  a	  process	   that	  included	  only	  notice	  of	  the	  Commission's	  tentative	  conclusions	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  make	  written	  objections.48	  	  The	  Court	  thought	  it	  significant	  that	  the	  ICC’s	  decision	  in	   that	   case	  was	   “applicable	   across	   the	   board”	   and	   that	   “[n]o	   effort	   was	  made	   to	  single	   out	   any	   particular	   railroad	   for	   special	   consideration	   based	   on	   its	   own	  particular	   circumstances.”49	   	   The	   “factual	   inferences”	   the	   ICC	   relied	   on,	   the	   Court	  explained,	  “were	  used	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  basically	  legislative-­‐type	  judgment,	  for	  prospective	  application	  only,	  rather	  than	  in	  adjudicating	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  disputed	  facts.”50	  	  In	  due	  process	  terms,	  the	  Court	  thus	  placed	  the	  ICC’s	  decision	  on	  the	  side	  of	  
Bi-­Metallic	   Investment	  Co.	   51	  –	  requiring	  “no	  hearing	  at	  all”52	   for	  generalized	  policy	  judgments	   –	   rather	   than	   on	   the	   side	   of	   Londoner	   v.	   Denver,	   requiring	   “argument	  however	   brief"	   and	   "if	   need	   be,	   ...	   proof,	   however	   informal”53	   in	   “proceedings	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	   Gary	   Lawson,	   Federal	   Administrative	   Law	   at	   229	   (5th	   ed.	   2009).	   	   For	   an	  instructive	  example	  of	  the	  courts’	  ease,	  after	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway,	  in	  denying	  trial-­‐type	   procedures	   under	   the	   APA	   in	   the	   rulemaking	   context,	   see	   AT&T	   v.	   FCC,	  572	  F.2d	  17,	  22	  (2d	  Cir.	  1978)	  (noting	  that	  the	  applicable	  statute	  required	  only	  that	  rules	   be	   made	   “after	   full	   opportunity	   for	   hearing,”	   and	   not	   “on	   the	   record,”	   and	  concluding,	  “[t]herefore,”	  that	  the	  APA	  did	  not	  require	  trial-­‐type	  procedures).	  48	  410	  U.S.	  at	  233-­‐34.	  49	  Id.	  at	  246.	  50	  Id.	  at	  246.	  51	  Bi-­‐Metallic	  Investment	  Co.	  v.	  State	  Board	  of	  Equalization,	  239	  U.S.	  441	  (1915).	  52	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway,	  410	  U.S.	  at	  245.	  53	  Londoner	  v.	  Denver,	  210	  U.S.	  373,	  386	  (1908).	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designed	  to	  adjudicate	  disputed	  facts	   in	  particular	  cases.”54	  Under	  neither	  the	  APA	  nor	   the	   Interstate	  Commerce	  Act,	   therefore,	  was	   the	  Commission	  required	   to	  hold	  formal,	  trial-­‐type	  hearings	  before	  coming	  to	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  matters	  at	  hand.	  	   A	   similar	   story,	   tracing	   the	   move	   from	   formality	   to	   informality,	   holds	   for	  adjudication.	   	   Although	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   in	   Florida	   East	   Coast	   Railway,	  distinguished	   rulemaking	   from	   adjudication	   and	   suggested	   that	   the	   procedural	  requirements	   for	  the	   latter	  could	  be	  greater	  than	  those	  for	  the	  former,55	   the	  Court	  has	   -­‐-­‐	   quite	   remarkably	   -­‐-­‐	   never	   taken	   up	   the	   question	   whether	   the	   holding	   of	  
Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway	  applies	  to	  adjudication	  as	  well	  as	  rulemaking.	  	  The	  lower	  courts	   have,	   however,	   embraced	   the	   implications	   of	  Florida	   East	   Coast	   Railway	   in	  the	   adjudicatory	   context.	   	   One	   early	   decision,	   holding	   that	   statutes	   requiring	  "hearings"	   for	   adjudicatory	   decisions	   must	   be	   presumed	   to	   require	   formal	  hearings,56	   has	   been	   overruled.57	   	   Another	   case	   has	   held	   that	   Florida	   East	   Coast	  
Railway	  requires	  the	  opposite	  presumption	  –	  that,	  unless	  Congress	  clearly	  indicates	  otherwise,	   the	  bare	   requirement	   of	   a	   “hearing”	   in	   the	   adjudicatory	   context	  means	  that	  only	  informal,	  not	  formal,	  proceedings	  are	  required.58	  	  Several	  courts,	  bowing	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  Chevron	  in	  modern	  administrative	  law,	  have	  held	  that	  an	  agency's	  views	  on	  whether	   formal	  procedures	   are	   required	   for	   adjudication	   are	   entitled	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Id.	  at	  244-­‐45.	  55	  410	  U.S.	  at	  244-­‐45.	  56	  Seacoast	  Anti-­‐Pollution	  League	  v.	  Costle,	  572	  F.2d	  872	  (1st	  Cir.	  1978).	  57	  Dominion	  Energy	  Brayton	  Point	  v.	  Johnson,	  443	  F.3d	  12	  (1st	  Cir.	  2006).	  58	  City	  of	  West	  Chicago	  v.	  NRC,	  701	  F.2d	  632,	  641	  (7th	  Cir.	  1983).	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deference	  so	  long	  as	  they	  are	  reasonable.59	  	  Every	  case	  applying	  this	  framework	  has	  upheld	  the	  agency's	  choice	  to	  use	  informal	  processes	  rather	  than	  formal	  ones.	  	  	   The	   move	   toward	   informal	   process	   gained	   additional,	   and	   considerable,	  momentum	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court's	  1978	  decision	   in	  Vermont	  Yankee	  v.	  Natural	  
Resource	  Defense	  Council.60	   	  There,	  the	  Court	  famously	  shut	  down	  the	  D.C.	  Circuit's	  efforts	   to	   bring	   more	   formal	   procedures	   -­‐-­‐	   such	   as	   depositions	   and	   cross-­‐examination	   -­‐-­‐	   to	   informal	   rulemaking.61	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   constitutional	  constraint,	   "extremely	   compelling	   circumstances,"	   or	   a	   statute	   expressly	   requiring	  more	  formal	  procedures,	  the	  agency	  -­‐-­‐	  not	  the	  judiciary	  -­‐-­‐	  was	  the	  master	  of	  its	  own	  procedures,	   and	   so	   long	   as	   it	   offered	   the	   statutory	   minima,	   its	   procedural	  obligations	   were	   satisfied.62	   	   No	   longer	   would	   agencies	   undertaking	   "informal"	  rulemaking	   proceedings	   need	   to	   import	   trial-­‐type	   features.	   	   Of	   course,	   even	   after	  
Vermont	   Yankee,	   courts	   piled	   burdensome	   requirements	   of	   disclosure	   and	  explanation	   on	   top	   of	   the	   bare-­‐bones	   requirements	   of	   the	   APA.63	   	   But	   Vermont	  
Yankee	   did	   put	   a	   stop	   to	   the	   courts'	   efforts	   to	   turn	   informal	   rulemaking	   into	   the	  trial-­‐like	  endeavor	  eschewed	  in	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway.	  	   Vermont	  Yankee	   also	   effectively	   embraced	   the	  practice	  of	  using	   rulemaking	  proceedings	  to	  determine	  generic	  factual	  issues	  relevant	  to	  individual	  adjudicatory	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Dominion	  Energy	  Brayton	  Point,	  443	  F.3d	  at	  16-­‐18;	  Chemical	  Waste	  Mgmt.	  v.	  EPA,	  873	  F.2d	  1477	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1989);	  Sibley	  v.	  US	  Dept.	  of	  Education,	  913	  F.	  Supp.	  1181	  (N.D.	  Ill.	  1995);	  Shell	  Oil	  v.	  US	  Dept.	  of	  Labor,	  106	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  15	  (D.D.C.	  2000).	  60	  435	  U.S.	  519	  (1978).	  61	   See,	   e.g.,	  Gillian	  E.	  Metzger,	  The	  Story	  of	  Vermont	  Yankee:	  A	  Cautionary	  Tale	  of	  Judicial	   Review	   and	   Nuclear	   Waste,	   in	   Administrative	   Law	   Stories	   125,	   143-­‐48	  (Peter	  L.	  Strauss	  ed.,	  2006).	  62	  435	  U.S.	  at	  543-­‐48,	  549	  n.	  21.	  63	   See,	   e.g.,	   Jack	  M.	   Beermann	   &	   Gary	   Lawson,	   Reprocessing	   Vermont	   Yankee,	   75	  Geo.	  Wash.	  L.	  Rev.	  856	  (2007).	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proceedings.	   	   There,	   the	   Nuclear	   Regulatory	   Commission	   had	   issued	   a	   rule	   that	  provided	  numerical	  values	  for	  the	  environmental	  impacts	  of	  the	  uranium	  fuel	  cycle,	  including	  the	  long-­‐term	  disposal	  of	  high-­‐level	  radioactive	  waste.64	  	  The	  Commission	  intended	   to	   use	   these	   values	   in	   the	   cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   for	   individual	   licensing	  proceedings.65	   	   Thus,	   even	  where	   formal	   evidentiary	  hearings	  were	   thought	   to	   be	  required	   in	   individual	   proceedings,	   an	   agency	   could	   narrow	   the	   range	   of	   factual	  issues	  to	  be	  determined	  in	  those	  proceedings	  by	  conducting	  a	  generic	  rulemaking	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  individual	  proceedings.66	  	   During	   this	   period,	   agencies	   also	   found	   ways	   to	   make	   even	   their	   formal	  proceedings	  more	   streamlined.	   	   Indeed,	   the	  FDA	   itself	  was	  a	  pioneer	   in	   importing	  the	  procedural	   innovations	  of	   the	  Federal	  Rules	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	   -­‐-­‐	   including	  the	  avoidance	  of	  trial-­‐type	  proceedings	  through	  mechanisms	  like	  summary	  judgment	  -­‐-­‐	  into	   the	  agency's	   internal	  decision-­‐making	   framework.67	   	   Faced	  with	   thousands	  of	  applications	   for	   approval	   of	   new	  drugs,	   the	   agency	   found	   that	   it	   simply	   could	  not	  expeditiously	   perform	   its	   job	   of	   review	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   holding	   formal	  hearings	  on	  drug	  applications.	  	  Thus,	  the	  agency	  turned	  to	  administrative	  summary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  435	  U.S.	  at	  528-­‐30.	  65	  435	  U.S.	  at	  528.	  66	   The	   Nuclear	   Regulatory	   Commission	   eventually	   concluded	   that	   its	   enabling	  statute	  did	  not,	  in	  fact,	  require	  formal	  hearings	  on	  various	  nuclear	  licensing	  matters,	  and	   issued	   a	   rule	   streamlining	   its	   procedures.	   	   NRC,	   Changes	   to	   Adjudicatory	  Process,	   69	   Fed.	   Reg.	   2,182.	   	   The	   First	   Circuit	   upheld	   this	   rule	   without	   deciding	  whether	  the	  formal	  hearing	  requirements	  of	  the	  APA	  were	  required,	  since	  the	  court	  decided	   that	   in	   any	   event	   the	   Commission's	   new	   procedures	   satisfied	   APA	  requirements	   for	   formal	   hearings.	   	   Citizens	   Awareness	   Network	   v.	   United	   States,	  391	  F.3d	  338	  (1st	  Cir.	  2004).	  67	  Charles	  C.	  Ames	  &	  Steven	  C.	  McCracken,	  Framing	  Regulatory	  Standards	  to	  Avoid	  Formal	  Adjudication:	  The	  FDA	  As	  a	  Case	  Study,	  64	  Calif.	  L.	  Rev.	  14	  (1976).	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judgment	   as	   a	  way	  out	   of	   this	   predicament	   -­‐-­‐	   a	   solution	   affirmed	  by	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  in	  1973.68	  	   In	   the	   same	   period,	   the	   FDA	   -­‐-­‐	   bruised	   by	   its	   superintending	   of	   absurdly	  prolonged	   formal	   hearings,	   including,	   most	   infamously,	   an	   eleven-­‐year	  administrative	   odyssey	   exploring	   the	   foundational	   question	   of	   the	   percentage	   of	  peanuts	   that	   "peanut	   butter"	  must	   contain69	   -­‐-­‐	  was	   encouraged	   to	   introduce	   legal	  adjustments	  aimed	  in	  part	  at	  avoiding	  the	  procedural	  quagmires	  created	  by	  formal	  hearings.70	  	   Through	  it	  all,	  however,	   the	  FDA	  has	  steadfastly	  maintained	  that	   it	  may	  not	  withdraw	   approval	   for	   a	   drug	   given	   to	   animals	   unless	   it	   first	   holds	   a	   formal	  evidentiary	  hearing.	  	  The	  large-­‐scale	  shifts	  in	  administrative	  law,	  from	  adjudication	  to	  rulemaking	  and	   from	  formal	   to	   informal	  decision-­‐making	   frameworks,	  have	   left	  the	  agency	  unmoved	  on	   this	  matter.	   	  Even	   the	  FDA's	  own	  procedural	   innovations,	  undertaken	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   expedition	   and	   experimentation,	   have	   not	   found	   their	  way	  into	  this	  corner	  of	  the	  agency's	  work.	  	  The	  agency's	  unyielding	  legal	  position	  -­‐-­‐	  that	  formal	  hearings	  must	  precede	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  approval	  for	  animal	  drugs	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  like	   an	   administrative-­‐law	   time	   capsule,	   filled	   decades	   ago	   and	   untouched	   ever	  since.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	   Weinberger	   v.	   Hynson,	   Westcott	   &	   Dunning,	   412	   U.S.	   609,	   620	   (1973).	   	   For	   a	  thoughtful	   treatment	   of	   another	  procedural	   innovation	  offered	  by	   the	  FDA	  during	  this	  period,	  a	  hearing	  before	  a	  Public	  Board	  of	   Inquiry	  comprised	  of	  scientists,	  see	  Sidney	   A.	   Shapiro,	   Scientific	   Issues	   and	   the	   Function	   of	   Hearing	   Procedures:	  Evaluating	  the	  FDA’s	  Public	  Board	  of	  Inquiry,	  1986	  Duke	  L.J.	  288.	  69	   Robert	   W.	   Hamilton,	   Rulemaking	   on	   a	   Record	   by	   the	   Food	   and	   Drug	  Administration,	  50	  Texas	  L.	  Rev.	  1132,	  1142-­‐45	  (1972).	  70	  Richard	  A.	  Merrill	  &	  Earl	  M.	  Collier,	  Jr.,	  “Like	  Mother	  Used	  to	  Make”:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  FDA	  Food	  Standards	  of	  Identity,	  74	  Colum.	  L.	  Rev.	  561	  (1974).	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B.	  	  The	  FDCA	  and	  the	  Meaning	  of	  a	  “Hearing”	  	   Nothing	   in	   the	   FDCA	   requires	   the	   FDA	   to	   cling	   so	   tenaciously	   to	   formal	  procedures.	  	  	  	   First	   of	   all,	   it	   has	   been	   clear	   for	   decades	   that,	   whatever	   procedural	  requirements	   the	   FDCA	   sets	   for	   individual	   proceedings,	   the	   FDA	   may	   undertake	  generic	   rulemaking	   in	   order	   to	   limit	   the	   issues	   to	   be	   resolved	   in	   individual	  proceedings.	  	  The	  FDA	  has	  general	  authority	  to	  issue	  rules,71	  and	  those	  rules	  may	  be	  issued	   after	   informal,	   notice-­‐and-­‐comment	   processes.	   	   Nothing	   prevents	   the	   FDA	  from	  initiating	  a	  rulemaking	  proceeding	  on	  the	  risks	  posed	  by	  the	  administration	  of	  antibiotics	   to	   food	   animals	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   promoting	   growth	   and	   preventing	  infections,	   and	   then	   applying	   the	   findings	   of	   that	   proceeding	   to	   any	   decision	  whether	   to	   withdraw	   approval	   of	   a	   specific	   antibiotic	   –	   or	   even	   applying	   those	  findings	   in	   declining	   an	   individual	   hearing	   altogether.	   	   Years	   ago,	   the	   D.C.	   Circuit	  suggested	   just	   this	   solution	   to	   the	   FDA’s	   difficulties	   in	   acting	   promptly	   on	   initial	  drug	  approvals:	   “The	   [FDA]	  could	  alleviate	   its	  own	   inefficiencies,	  perhaps	   through	  generic	   rulemaking…”72	   	   This	   advice	   applies	   just	   as	   well	   to	   decisions	   about	  antibiotics	   in	   animal	   feed,	   where	   generic	   issues	   of	   safety	   predominate.	   	   As	   the	  magistrate	   judge	   in	  NRDC	   v.	   FDA	   noted,	   “[t]here	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   the	   scientific	  studies	   undertaken	   by	   various	   groups	   and	   government	   bodies	   draw	   different	  conclusions	   for	  different	  antibiotics.	   	   Indeed,	   the	  FDA	  appears	   to	  accept	   that	  all	  of	  the	   classes	   of	   antibiotics	   at	   issue	   pose	   a	   similar	   threat,	   as	   its	   proposed	   voluntary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(a).	  72	  In	  re	  Barr	  Laboratories	  v.	  National	  Association	  of	  Pharmaceutical	  Manufacturers,	  930	  F.2d	  72,	  76	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1991)	  (citing	  Heckler	  v.	  Campbell,	  461	  U.S.	  458	  (1983)).	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approach	  makes	   no	   distinction.”73	   	   Even	   so,	   unaccountably,	   the	   FDA	   has	   failed	   to	  recognize	   the	   availability	   of	   generic	   rulemaking	   to	   address	   the	   risks	   posed	   by	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed.	   	  And,	  more	  than	  that,	   it	  has	  doubled	  down	  on	  its	  1950s-­‐era	   understanding	   of	   American	   administrative	   law	   by	   asserting	   that	   it	  must	   hold	  formal	  hearings,	  not	  even	  on	  whole	  classes	  of	  antibiotics	  at	  once,	  but	  on	  a	  “drug-­‐by-­‐drug”	  basis.74	  	  The	  FDA’s	  antiquated	  view	  of	  its	  procedural	  obligations	  has	  blinded	  it	  to	   the	   regulatory	   possibilities	   posed	   by	   generic	   rulemaking	   on	   common	   scientific	  issues.	   	   These	   possibilities	   are	   open	   to	   the	   agency	   regardless	   whether	   the	   FDCA	  requires	   formal	   hearings	   in	   individual	   proceedings	   to	   withdraw	   approvals	   for	  animal	  drugs.	  	   	  In	  any	  event,	  the	  FDCA	  does	  not	  require	  formal	  hearings	  in	  this	  context.	  	  The	  FDA's	   authority	   to	   withdraw	   approvals	   for	   animal	   drugs	   comes	   from	   section	  512(e)(1)	   of	   the	   Food,	   Drug	   and	   Cosmetic	   Act.	   	   This	   provision	   states	   that	   the	  "Secretary"	   (of	   the	   Department	   of	   Health	   and	   Human	   Services,	   who	   has	   in	   turn	  delegated	  this	  authority	  to	  the	  FDA	  Commissioner75)	  "shall"	  withdraw	  approval	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  NRDC	  II,	  at	  46	  n.	  24	  (slip	  opinion).	  74	  FDA	  Tentative	  Response	  to	  2005	  Petition	  (Oct.	  4,	  2005)	  (“For	  legal,	  scientific	  and	  resource	  reasons,	  withdrawal	  actions	  for	  the	  petitioned	  drugs	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  on	  a	  drug	  by	  drug	  basis.”).	   	  The	  magistrate	   judge	   in	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA	  expressed	  some	  mystification	  at	  the	  FDA’s	  assertion	  on	  this	  point.	  	  NRDC	  II,	  at	  46	  n.	  24	  (slip	  opinion).	  75	   FDA	   Staff	   Manual	   Guides,	   Volume	   II	   –	   Delegations	   of	   Authority,	   Regulatory	  Delegations	  of	  Authority	  to	  the	  Commissioner	  Food	  and	  Drugs	  §	  1410.10(1)(A)(1).	  available	   	   at	  http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/ucm080711.htm	  (delegating	  HHS	  Secretary’s	  authority	  over	   functions	  under	   the	  FDCA	   to	  the	  FDA	  Commissioner).	  
Forthcoming,	  Vermont	  Law	  Review	  (2013)	  (symposium	  issue)	  
	   20	  
animal	  drugs	   in	  several	  circumstances.	   	   	  The	   language	  pertinent	   to	   the	  problem	  of	  antibiotics	  used	  in	  animal	  feed	  is	  as	  follows:76	  The	   Secretary	   shall,	   after	   due	   notice	   and	   opportunity	   for	   hearing	   to	   the	  applicant,	   withdraw	   approval	   of	   an	   application	   with	   respect	   to	   any	   drug	  under	   this	   section	   if	   the	  Secretary	   finds	   ...	   (2)	   that	  new	  evidence	  of	   clinical	  experience,	   not	   contained	   in	   such	   application	   or	   not	   available	   to	   the	  Secretary	   until	   after	   such	   application	   was	   approved,	   or	   tests	   by	   new	  methods,	  or	  tests	  by	  methods	  not	  deemed	  reasonably	  applicable	  when	  such	  application	  was	  approved,	  evaluated	  together	  with	  the	  evidence	  available	  to	  the	   Secretary	  when	   the	   application	  was	   approved,	   shows	   that	   such	  drug	   is	  not	   shown	   to	  be	   safe	   for	  use	  under	   the	   conditions	  of	  use	  upon	   the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  application	  was	  approved	  ...77	  	  Notice	  what	  this	  provision	  does	  not	  say.	  	  It	  does	  not	  specify	  any	  particular	  format	  for	  the	  required	  "hearing."	   	   It	  does	  not	  say	  that	  the	  agency's	  ultimate	  decision	  is	  to	  be	  "on	  the	  record."	   	   It	  does	  not,	   in	  short,	  contain	  anything	  close	  to	  the	  "magic	  words"	  that	  courts,	  since	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway,	  have	  looked	  for	  before	  requiring	  formal	  hearings.	   78	   	  Moreover,	   the	   provision	   stands	   in	   contrast	   to	   another	   section	   of	   the	  FDCA,	   which	   does	   contain	   the	   special	   language.	   	   Section	   701(e)(3),79	   specifically	  cited	  in	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway	  for	  the	  proposition	  that	  some	  statutes	  did	  indeed	  use	  the	  words	  the	  Court	  was	  looking	  for,80	  states	  that	  certain	  FDA	  decisions	  must	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  “public	  hearing”	   if	  one	   is	  requested	  and	  must	  be	  made	  “only	  on	  substantial	  evidence	  of	  record	  at	  such	  hearing.”81	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  NRDC	  I,	  at	  23	  n.	  9	  (slip	  opinion).	  77	  21	  U.S.C.	  360b(e)(1).	  78	   Mobil	   Oil	   Corp.	   v.	   Federal	   Power	   Commission,	   483	   F.2d	   1238,	   1250	   (D.C.	   Cir.	  1973).	  79	  21	  U.S.C	  .	  371(e)(3).	  80	  410	  U.S.	  at	  238	  (citing	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(3)).	  81	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(3).	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   In	   section	  701(e)(1),	  Congress	   identified	   the	  FDA	  decisions	   to	  be	  made	  “on	  	  substantial	  evidence	  of	  record"	  under	  section	  701(e)(3).82	   	  The	  extreme	  specificity	  with	  which	  Congress	   identified	   these	  decisions	   indicates	   that	  Congress	  acted	  with	  precision	  and	  care.83	  	  The	  specific	  decisions	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  hearing	  on	  the	  evidence	   of	   record	   concern	   the	   labeling	   of	   food	   offered	   for	   special	   dietary	   uses,84	  emergency	  permit	  control	  of	  classes	  of	  food	  contaminated	  with	  micro-­‐organisms,85	  tolerances	  for	  poisonous	  ingredients	  in	  food,86	  drugs	  adulterated	  on	  account	  of	  their	  departures	   from	   specifications	   in	   official	   compendia,87	   drugs	   misbranded	   on	  account	  of	  their	  propensity	  to	  deteriorate,88	  definitions	  and	  standards	  of	  identity	  for	  dairy	  products,89	  and	  definitions	  and	  standards	  of	  identity	  for	  "maple	  sirup."90	  	  Out	  of	  all	  of	  the	  hundreds	  of	  regulatory	  decisions	  contemplated	  by	  the	  FDCA,	  Congress	  plucked	  these	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  these	  alone	  -­‐-­‐	  out	  of	  the	  mass	  and	  specified	  that	  they	  would	  be	  preceded	   by	   hearings	   on	   the	   evidence	   of	   record.	   	   Tellingly	   for	   our	   purposes,	  decisions	   to	   withdraw	   approval	   for	   animal	   drugs	   do	   not	   appear	   in	   section	  701(e)(1)'s	  selective	  list.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	   21	  U.S.C.	   371(e)(1)	   (specifying	   the	   agency	   actions	   subject	   to	   certain	  procedural	  requirements);	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(2)	  (offering	  opportunity	  to	  those	  adversely	  affected	  by	  decisions	   identified	   in	   section	  701(e)(1)	   to	   request	   “public	   hearing”);	   21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(3)	  (specifying	  hearing	  requirements	  that	  take	  hold	  “after	  such	  request	  for	  a	  public	  hearing”).	  83	  Congress	  identified	  the	  relevant	  decisions	  in	  section	  701(e)(1)	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  FDCA	  provisions	  governing	  these	  decisions.	  	  See	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1).	  84	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1)	  (citing	  FDCA	  403(j),	  21	  U.S.C.	  343(j)).	  85	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1)	  (citing	  FDCA	  404(a),	  21	  U.S.C.	  344(a)).	  86	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1)	  (citing	  FDCA	  406,	  21	  U.S.C.	  346).	  87	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1)	  (citing	  FDCA	  501(b),	  21	  U.S.C.	  351(b)).	  88	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1)	  (citing	  FDCA	  502(h),	  21	  U.S.C.	  352(h)).	  89	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1)	  (citing	  DCA	  401,	  21	  U.S.C.	  341).	  90	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1)	  (citing	  FDCA	  401,	  21	  U.S.C.	  341).	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   Also	   probative	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   another	   provision	   of	   the	   FDCA	   explicitly	  imports	   the	   requirements	   of	   section	  701(e).	   	   The	  provision	   on	   color	   additives	   for	  foods,	   drugs,	   and	   cosmetics	   expressly	   states	   that	   section	   701(e)	   applies	   to	   the	  issuance,	   amendment,	   or	   repeal	   of	   regulations	   under	   that	   provision.91	   	   This	  provision	   also	   expressly	   adopts	   the	   APA’s	   requirements	   on	   burdens	   of	   proof	   and	  other	  matters	   in	   formal	   hearings.92	   	   Section	   512(e)(1),	   on	  withdrawing	   approvals	  for	  new	  animal	  drugs,	  does	  not	  adopt	  section	  701(e)	  and	  its	  reference	  to	  “evidence	  of	  record.”	  	   Nothing	   else	   in	   the	   FDCA	   suggests	   that	   formal	   hearings	   are	   required	  when	  FDA	  withdraws	  approvals	   for	  animal	  drugs.	   	  Section	  512(e)(3)	  does	  direct	   that	  an	  order	   to	  withdrawal	  an	  approval	   “state	   the	   findings	  upon	  which	   it	   is	  based.”93	  But	  section	  701(e)(1)	  does	  so	  as	  well	  –	  in	  the	  same	  sentence	  in	  which	  it	  requires	  that	  the	  decisions	  it	  covers	  be	  made	  on	  “evidence	  of	  record.”94	  	  Congress’s	  failure	  to	  include	  the	  requirement	  of	  on-­‐the-­‐record	  findings	  in	  section	  512(e)(3),	  when	  it	  did	  include	  it	   in	   section	   701(e)(1),	   warrants	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   simple	   requirement	   of	  “findings”	  does	  not	  smuggle	  into	  section	  512(e)	  a	  requirement	  for	  formal,	  trial-­‐type	  hearings.	   	   Nor	   does	   section	   701(c)’s	   requirement	   that	   “[h]earings	   authorized	   or	  required”	  by	  the	  FDCA	  be	  “conducted	  by	  the	  Secretary	  or	  such	  officer	  or	  employee	  as	   he	  may	   designate	   for	   the	   purpose”95	   create	   such	   a	   requirement.	   	   Although	   the	  Center	  for	  Veterinary	  Medicine	  has	  listed	  this	  provision	  as	  “authority”	  for	  its	  policies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  21	  U.S.C.	  379e(d).	  92	  21	  U.S.C.	  379e(d)(2)	  (incorporating	  5	  U.S.C.	  1006(c),	  now	  5	  U.S.C.	  556(d)).	  93	  21	  U.S.C.	  360b(e)(3).	  94	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(e)(1).	  95	  21	  U.S.C.	  371(c).	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on	  the	  management	  of	  formal	  evidentiary	  hearings,96	  the	  statutory	  instruction	  that	  “hearings”	  be	  conducted	  by	   the	  Secretary	  or	  someone	  designated	  by	   the	  Secretary	  says	  nothing	  about	  the	  formality	  or	  informality	  of	  such	  hearings.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  Florida	  
East	  Coast	  Railway,	   the	  relevant	  provision	  of	  the	  Interstate	  Commerce	  Act	  directed	  the	   Interstate	   Commerce	   Commission	   itself	   to	  make	   the	   decision	   under	   review.97	  	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  did	  not	  so	  much	  as	  mention	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  designation	  of	  the	  Commission	  as	  the	  relevant	  decision	  maker	  meant	  that	  formal,	  not	  informal,	  rulemaking	  procedures	  were	  required	  for	  this	  decision.	  	   Although	  the	  FDCA	  does	  not	  define	  the	  term	  “hearing”	  in	  section	  512(e),	  the	  statute	  does	  define	   the	   term	  “informal	  hearing”	  and	   it	   states	  certain	  requirements	  for	   this	   kind	   of	   hearing.98	   	   According	   to	   the	   statutory	   definition,	   an	   “informal	  hearing”	  is	  one	  “not	  subject	  to	  section	  554,	  556,	  or	  557	  of	  title	  5	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Code”	  –	  the	  APA	  provisions	  on	  formal	  administrative	  proceedings.	  	  Some	  provisions	  of	   the	  FDCA	  specifically	  require	  an	  “informal	  hearing”	  before	  certain	  decisions	  can	  be	   made.99	   	   Section	   512(e)	   requires	   only	   a	   “hearing,”	   pure	   and	   simple	   –	   not	   a	  hearing	   on	   “evidence	   of	   record,”	   and	   not	   an	   “informal	   hearing”	   as	   specified	  elsewhere.	  The	   absence	   of	   the	   words	   “on	   the	   record”	   or	   words	   of	   equivalent	   clarity	  dooms	   any	   argument	   that	   the	   Administrative	   Procedure	   Act	   requires	   the	   FDA	   to	  hold	   formal	   evidentiary	   hearings	   before	   it	   withdraws	   its	   approval	   of	   an	   animal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	   FDA,	   Center	   for	   Veterinary	   Medicine,	   Program	   Policy	   and	   Procedures	   Manual,	  1240.3670,	  section	  2(a)(5)	  (revised	  11/05/09).	  97	  49	  U.S.C.	  1(14)(a).	  98	  21	  U.S.C.	  321(x).	  99	  See,	  e.g.,	  21	  U.S.C.	  360h;	  360ccc;	  360j;	  387j.	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drug.100	   	  With	  the	  APA	  out	  of	   the	  picture,	   the	  only	  question	   is	  whether	  the	  FDCA’s	  requirement	  of	   a	   “hearing,”	   standing	  alone,	   requires	   formal,	   trial-­‐type	  processes	  –	  and,	  if	  so,	  which	  ones.	  	  The	  latter	  question	  becomes	  important	  once	  the	  APA	  is	  out	  of	  the	   picture	   because	   the	   APA	   brings	   with	   it	   a	   long	   list	   of	   off-­‐the-­‐shelf	   procedural	  requirements	   for	   formal	   agency	   proceedings.	   	   These	   requirements	   include	  prohibitions	  on	  ex	  parte	  contacts,	  an	  impartial	  decision	  maker,	  formal	  findings,	  and	  more.101	   	   In	   contrast,	   apart	   from	   requiring	   a	   “hearing”	   and	   “findings,”	   the	   FDCA	  simply	   does	   not	   identify	   any	   specific	   procedures	   that	  must	   attend	  withdrawals	   of	  approvals	  for	  animal	  drugs.	  	  This	  alone	  should	  give	  us	  pause	  before	  concluding	  that	  the	  FDCA	  itself	  creates	  a	  requirement	  for	  formal	  hearings.	  	  But	  more	  fundamentally,	  as	  already	  discussed,	  there	  is	  simply	  nothing	  in	  the	  FDCA	  that	  suggests	  that	  formal	  hearings	   of	   any	   kind	   are	   required	   before	   the	   FDA	   may	   withdraw	   approvals	   for	  animal	  drugs.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  in	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway	  itself,102	  the	  kinds	  of	  decisions	  important	  for	  present	  purposes	  -­‐-­‐	  decisions	  whether	  antibiotics	  given	  to	  animals	  for	  purposes	  of	  promoting	  growth	  and	  preventing	  infection	  are	  “safe”	  -­‐-­‐	  are	  broad	  ones,	  based	  on	  scientific	  facts	  that	  cut	  across	  the	  manufacturers	  and	  users	  of	  these	  drugs.	  	  They	   are,	   to	   use	   Kenneth	   Culp	   Davis's	   influential	   formulation,	   "legislative,"	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  See	  text	  at	  notes	  35-­‐38,	  supra.	  101	  5	  U.S.C.	  556,	  557.	  102	  410	  U.S.	  at	  245-­‐46.	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"adjudicative,"	   facts.103	   	  They	  are	  exactly	   the	  kinds	  of	   facts	   that	  warrant	  departure	  from	  the	  trial-­‐type	  framework	  the	  FDA	  has	  clung	  to.104	  	   So	   far,	   I	   have	   elided	   the	   question	   whether	   proceedings	   to	   withdraw	  approvals	   for	   animal	   drugs	   should	   be	   characterized	   as	   "rulemaking"	   or	   as	  "adjudication."	  	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  characterization	  might	  matter	  is	  that	  the	  cases	  following	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway	  seem	  to	  make	  something	  of	  the	  distinction.	  	  As	  I	  have	  said,	  no	  case	  has	   found	   that	   formal	   rulemaking	   is	   required	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  special	   words	   not	   present	   here.	   	   Yet	   the	   contemporary	   trend	   of	   cases	   in	   the	  adjudicatory	  context	  has	  been	  to	  defer	  to	  the	  agency's	  views	  on	  whether	  formal	  or	  informal	  proceedings	  are	   required.	   	   If	  decisions	   to	  withdraw	  approvals	   for	  animal	  drugs	   are	   adjudicatory,	   therefore,	   then	   perhaps	   the	   FDA's	   view	   that	   formal	  proceedings	  are	  required	  can	  be	  saved,	  after	  all,	  as	  a	  permissible	   interpretation	  of	  the	  statute	  the	  FDA	  is	  charged	  with	  implementing.	  	   It	   is	  not	  so	  easy	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  characterize	  these	  decisions.	   	  The	  FDA	  itself	  has	  sometimes	  (without	  explanation)	  characterized	  them	  as	  "adjudication."105	  	  And	  one	  of	  the	  end	  products	  of	  these	  decisions	  is	  an	  "order,"	  often	  (but	  not	  always)	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  proceeding	  is	  an	  adjudication.	   	  Yet	  decisions	  to	  withdraw	  approvals	  for	   animal	   drugs	   also	   produce	   rules	   -­‐-­‐	   rules	   that	   revoke	   rules	   setting	   forth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Kenneth	  Culp	  Davis,	  An	  Approach	  to	  Problems	  of	  Evidence	  in	  the	  Administrative	  Process,	  55	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  365	  (1942).	  104	   The	   numerous	   cases	   embracing	   this	   point	   include	   such	   administrative-­‐law	  classics	  as	  American	  Airlines,	  Inc.	  v.	  Civil	  Aeronautics	  Board,	  359	  F.2d	  624	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1966)	  (en	  banc);	  Allegheny-­‐Ludlum,	  406	  U.S.	  at	  757;	  Florida	  East	  Coast	  Railway,	  410	  U.S.	  at	  245-­‐46;	  and	  more.	  105	  FDA	  Commissioner,	  Final	  Decision	  on	  Enrofloxacin,	  at	  11,	  12,	  13,	  72,	  available	  at	  http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-­‐2000-­‐N-­‐0109-­‐0137.	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requirements	  for	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  animal	  drugs	  in	  question.106	   	  Moreover,	  as	  noted,	  the	  generalized	  nature	  of	  the	  facts	  relevant	  to	  the	  decisions	  suggests	  that	  the	   proceedings	   are	   more	   properly	   characterized	   as	   rulemaking	   rather	   than	   as	  adjudication.	   	   The	   withdrawal	   of	   an	   approval	   also	   acts	   prospectively,	   another	  hallmark	  of	  rulemaking.107	  	   Happily,	  however,	   for	  present	  purposes	   it	  does	  not	  really	  matter	  whether	  a	  proceeding	   to	   withdraw	   approval	   of	   animal	   drugs	   is	   rulemaking	   or	   adjudication.	  	  For	  the	  FDA	  has	  never	  offered	  an	  explanation	  of	  its	  interpretation	  of	  the	  FDCA	  that	  would	   qualify	   for	   Chevron	   deference.	   	   To	   the	   extent	   it	   has	   spoken	   at	   all	   of	   the	  reasons	   for	   its	   conclusion	   that	   formal	   evidentiary	   proceedings	   must	   precede	  withdrawals	  of	   approvals	   for	   animal	  drugs,	   it	  has	   spoken	   the	   language	  of	  Chevron	  step	   1	   rather	   than	   step	   2,	   stating	   that	   formal	   proceedings	   are	   “required	   by	  statute.”108	   	   That	   is,	   the	   agency	   has	   proceeded	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	   formal	  proceedings	   are	   required	   under	   the	   FDCA,	   no	  matter	  what	   the	   agency	   thinks;	   the	  agency	   believes	   the	   statute	   is,	   in	   the	   parlance	   of	   Chevron,	   unambiguous	   on	   this	  question.	   	  But	  the	  FDA	  is	  wrong	  on	  this	  point,	  as	  explained	  above.	   	  An	  agency	  does	  not	   receive	   Chevron	   deference	   when	   it	   has	   mistakenly	   concluded	   that	   its	  interpretation	  is	  compelled	  by	  Congress.109	  	  	  In	  that	  situation,	  the	  agency	  must,	  if	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  FDA	  Commissioner,	  Final	  Decision	  on	  Enrofloxacin,	  at	  121.	  107	  Bowen	  v.	  Georgetown	  University	  Hospital,	  488	  U.S.	  204	  (1988).	  108	   FDA	   Tentative	   Response	   to	   CSPI	   Petition,	   at	   2	   (Feb.	   28,	   2001),	   available	   at	  http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/01/Mar01/030201/let0006.pdf.	  109	  See,	  e.g.,	  Peter	  Pan	  Bus	  Lines,	  Inc.	  v.	  Federal	  Motor	  Carrier	  Safety	  Administration,	  471	   F.3d	   1350,	   1352,	   1354	   (D.C.	   Cir.	   2006);	   Secretary	   of	   Labor,	   Mine	   Safety	   and	  Health	  Administration	  v	  National	  Cement	  Co.	  of	  California,	  Inc.,	  494	  F.3d	  1066,	  1074	  (D.C.	   Cir.	   2007);	   International	   Swaps	   and	   Derivatives	   Ass’n	   v.	   CFTC,	   2012	   WL	  4466311	  (D.D.C.	  2012).	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wants	   its	   interpretation	   to	   prevail,	   explain	   why	   –	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   has	  discretion	  to	  interpret	  the	  statute	  differently	  –	  it	  has	  chosen	  to	  interpret	  the	  statute	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  has.110	  	  	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   imagine,	   moreover,	   how	   the	   agency	   could	   justify	   an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  FDCA	  that	  would	  require	  it	  to	  hold	  evidentiary	  hearings	  when	  it	  has	  the	  freedom,	  under	  the	  statute,	  to	  proceed	  more	  informally.	  	  The	  agency	  has,	  for	  decades,	  explained	  its	  immobility	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed	  by	  saying	   the	   law	  requires	   this	  slow	  and	  sorry	  state	  of	  affairs.	   	  The	  agency	  has	  never	  stated	   that	   formal	   proceedings	   are	   better	   than	   informal	   ones,	   that	   the	   resources	  required	  by	  formal	  proceedings	  are	  well	  spent,	  that	  the	  public	  health	  consequences	  of	  antibiotic	  resistance	  due	  to	  the	  widespread	  administration	  of	  antibiotics	  to	  food	  animals	  are	  unimportant	  compared	  to	  the	  desirability	  of	  trial-­‐type	  proceedings.	  	  The	  agency	   has	   never,	   in	   other	   words,	   justified	   formal	   evidentiary	   hearings	   on	   the	  merits.	  	  And	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  it	  could	  do	  so,	  given	  the	  checkered	  history	  of	  such	   proceedings	   in	   the	   agency,	   the	   agency's	   longstanding	   attempts	   (in	   other	  domains)	   to	   move	   away	   from	   such	   proceedings,	   and	   the	   agency's	   we-­‐are-­‐constrained-­‐to-­‐conclude	  attitude	  toward	  such	  proceedings	  in	  the	  specific	  matter	  of	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed.	  If	   the	  agency’s	   interpretation	  of	  section	  512(e)	  were	  challenged,	   the	  agency	  would	  be	  required	  to	  explain	  why	  it	  exercised	  its	  interpretive	  discretion	  to	  require	  formal	   rather	   than	   informal	   proceedings	   in	   this	   context.	   	   Given	   that	   the	   litigation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  PDK	  Labs	  v.	  DEA,	  362	  F.3d	  786,	  798	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  2004)	  (explaining	  that	  remand	  to	  agency	   for	   explanation	   of	   interpretive	   choice	   is	   necessary	   when	   agency	   has	  mistakenly	  asserted	  that	  statute	  is	  unambiguous	  on	  issue	  in	  question).	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pending	  in	  the	  Second	  Circuit	  does	  not	  raise	  this	  precise	  question,	  I	  suppose	  the	  FDA	  is	   free,	   for	   now,	   to	   continue	   to	   pretend	   that	   it	   is	   statutorily	   constrained	   to	   hold	  formal	  hearings	  –	  and	   to	  continue	   to	  refrain	   from	  explaining	  why.	   	  But	   this	  would	  not	   be	   a	   very	   public-­‐spirited	   way	   to	   proceed,	   especially	   in	   an	   administration	  committed	  to	  protecting	  public	  health	  and	  promoting	  government	  transparency.	  In	   this	   section,	   I	   have	   explained	   that	   the	   FDCA	   does	   not	   require	   formal	  hearings	  on	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  approvals	  for	  animal	  drugs	  and	  that	  the	  FDA	  has	  not	  justified	  its	  decision	  nevertheless	  to	  require	  such	  hearings.	  	  Next,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  FDA’s	  regulations	  on	  this	  point	  and	  explain	  that	  they,	  too,	  leave	  discretion	  to	  the	  agency	  on	  this	  matter	  –	  and	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  a	  non-­‐arbitrary	  reason	  for	  the	  agency	  to	  exercise	  this	  discretion	  in	  favor	  of	  procedural	  maximalism.	  C.	  	  Discretionary	  Procedural	  Maximalism	  	   The	   FDA’s	   own	   regulation	   on	   formal	   hearings	   appears	   to	   contemplate	   the	  kind	  of	  quandary	  just	  described,	  and	  to	  give	  the	  agency	  the	  freedom	  to	  depart	  from	  formal	  proceedings	  in	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  FDCA	  does	  not	  require	  them.	  	  This	  regulation,	   codified	   at	   21	   C.F.R.	   §	   10.50,	   states	   the	   circumstances	   under	   which	  formal	  proceedings	  are	  required,	  thus:	  	  (a)	   The	   Commissioner	   shall	   promulgate	   regulations	   and	   orders	   after	   an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  formal	  evidentiary	  public	  hearing	  under	  part	  12	  whenever	  all	  of	  the	  following	  apply:	  	  	  	  (1)	  The	  subject	  matter	  of	   the	  regulation	  or	  order	   is	  subject	  by	  statute	  to	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  formal	  evidentiary	  public	  hearing.	  	  	  	  (2)	   The	   person	   requesting	   the	   hearing	   has	   a	   right	   to	   an	   opportunity	   for	   a	  hearing	   and	   submits	   adequate	   justification	   for	   the	   hearing	   as	   required	   by	  parts	   12.20	   through	   12.22	   and	   other	   applicable	   provisions	   in	   this	   chapter,	  e.g.,	  parts	  314.200,	  514.200,	  and	  601.7(a).	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The	  natural	  reading	  of	  this	  regulation	  is	  that	  the	  FDA	  will	  provide	  formal	  evidentiary	  public	  hearings	  only	  where	   the	  FDCA	  requires	   formal	   evidentiary	  public	  hearings.	  	  The	  FDCA	  does	  not,	  as	  I	  have	  discussed,	  require	  formal	  evidentiary	  public	  hearings	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  withdrawals	  of	  approval	  of	  animal	  drugs.	  	  Thus,	  the	  regulation,	  so	  far,	  suggests	  a	  result	  no	  different	  from	  the	  one	  we	  have	  already	  reached:	  the	  FDA	  is	  not	  required	  to	  offer	  formal	  hearings	  in	  this	  context.	  But	  things	  get	  a	  little	  trickier	  in	  another	  part	  of	  the	  rule	  on	  formal	  hearings.	  	  The	  rule	  goes	  on	  to	   list	  “provisions	  of	  the	  act,	  and	  other	   laws,	  that	  afford	  a	  person	  who	   would	   be	   adversely	   affected	   by	   administrative	   action	   an	   opportunity	   for	   a	  formal	   evidentiary	  public	  hearing,”111	   and	   to	   include	   section	  512(e)	  on	   this	   list.112	  Yet	  the	  rule	  also	  expressly	  states	  that	  its	  list	  of	  statutory	  provisions	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  hearings	  are	  required	  when	  the	  statute	  does	  not	  require	  them,	  providing:	  “The	  list	   imparts	   no	   right	   to	   a	   hearing	   where	   the	   statutory	   section	   provides	   no	  opportunity	   for	   a	   hearing.”113	   	   By	   switching	   from	   the	   phrase	   “formal	   evidentiary	  public	  hearing”	  to	  “hearing,”	   it	   is	  possible,	   I	  suppose,	   that	   the	  FDA	  meant	  to	  signal	  that	   it	   would	   require	   formal	   hearings	   even	   where	   the	   listed	   statutory	   provisions	  required	  only	  “hearings.”	  	  	  This	  would	   be	   quite	   a	   strange	  way	   to	   interpret	   the	   rule.	   	   For	   one	   thing,	   it	  would	  undo	  the	  opening	  proviso	  of	   the	  rule,	   instructing	   the	  Commissioner	   to	  hold	  formal	   hearings	   only	   when	   “all	   of”	   certain,	   specified	   conditions	   apply	   –	   which	  conditions	  include	  being	  “the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  regulation	  or	  order”	  being	  “subject	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  21	  C.F.R.	  10.50(c).	  112	  21	  C.F.R.	  10.50(c)(17).	  113	  21	  C.F.R.	  10.50(1)(c).	  
Forthcoming,	  Vermont	  Law	  Review	  (2013)	  (symposium	  issue)	  
	   30	  
by	  statute	  to	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  formal	  evidentiary	  public	  hearing.”114	  	  This	  part	  of	  the	  rule	  unambiguously	  requires	  the	  FDA	  to	  ask,	  not	  whether	  the	  FDCA	  requires	  a	  hearing	   of	   some	   kind,	   but	  whether	   the	   statute	   requires	   the	   hearing	   to	   be	   formal.	  	  Moreover,	   section	   10.50(c)	   does	   not	   even	   purport	   to	   address	   this	   part	   of	   the	  opening	   proviso;	   it	   addresses	   only	   the	   second	   part,	   namely,	   statutorily	   afforded	  rights	   to	   aggrieved	   persons	   to	   the	   opportunity	   for	   a	   formal	   evidentiary	   public	  hearing.	  	  	  	   Equally	   important,	   the	   FDA	   has	   not	   said	   that	   it	   requires	   formal	   hearings	  under	   512(e)	   because	   its	   regulation	   requires	   them;	   it	   has	   said	   it	   requires	   such	  hearings	   because	   the	   statute	   requires	   them.	   	   At	   the	   very	   least,	   therefore,	   the	   FDA	  owes	   the	  public	   an	   explanation	  of	  why	   it	   has	   chosen	   to	   interpret	   its	   regulation	   in	  this	  way.	   	  Although	  agencies	  are	  given	  a	   large	  amount	  of	  deference	  when	  they	  are	  interpreting	   their	   own	   rules,115	   they	   must	   at	   least	   acknowledge	   that	   they	   are	  exercising	   interpretive	   discretion	   and	   not	   pretend	   that	   their	   hands	   are	   tied	  when	  they	   are	   not.	   	   Here,	   the	   FDA’s	   regulation	   appears	   not	   at	   all	   to	   require	   formal	  hearings	   when	   the	   FDCA	   does	   not	   require	   them,	   but	   the	   regulation	   is	   at	   most	  ambiguous	   on	   this	   point;	   it	   certainly	   does	   not	   unambiguously	   require	   formal	  hearings	   when	   the	   statute	   does	   not.	   	   If	   the	   FDA	   wants	   deference	   for	   an	  interpretation	   of	   an	   ambiguous	   rule,	   it	   must	   first	   rely	   on	   that	   rule	   and	   then	  acknowledge	  the	  ambiguity.	  Of	   course,	   an	   agency	   is	   free	   to	   grant	   more	   procedures	   than	   its	   enabling	  statute	   requires.	   	  This	   is	   one	  of	   the	   lessons	  of	  Vermont	  Yankee.	   	   This	  discretion	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  21	  C.F.R.	  10.50(a),	  (a)(1).	  115	  Auer	  v.	  Robbins,	  519	  U.S.	  452	  (1997).	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also	   recognized	   explicitly	   in	   the	   FDA’s	   rule	   on	   formal	   hearings,	   which	   allows	   the	  Commission	  to	  order	  a	  formal	  hearing	  “whenever	  it	  would	  be	  in	  the	  public	  interest	  to	   do	   so.”116	   	   But	   here,	   too,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   imagine	   the	   FDA	   being	   able	   to	   defend	   a	  decision	   to	   spend	   years	   on	   formal,	   trial-­‐type,	   procedurally	   maximalist	   hearings	  covering	  legislative-­‐type	  facts.	  	  Like	  any	  other	  agency	  decision,	  the	  FDA's	  decision	  to	  hold	   formal	   evidentiary	   hearings	   despite	   having	   the	   discretion	   to	   proceed	  informally	   would	   be	   subject	   to	   review	   for	   arbitrariness.	   	   	   Given	   the	   factors	   cited	  above	  in	  discussing	  Chevron	  deference	  –	  the	  agency’s	  unhappy	  history	  with	  respect	  to	  formal	  proceedings,	  its	  embrace	  of	  less	  formal	  proceedings	  in	  other	  settings,	  and	  its	  expressions	  of	  regret	  at	  the	  perceived	  need	  to	  conduct	  formal	  proceedings	  in	  the	  context	   of	   antibiotics	   in	   animal	   feed	   –	   the	   agency	   would	   have	   a	   difficult	   time	  explaining	   in	   a	   sensible	  way	  why	   it	   chose	   the	   longer	   rather	   than	   shorter	   path	   to	  protecting	  the	  public	  health.	  IV.	  	  Institutionalized	  Inaction	  	   The	  FDA's	  inaction	  on	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed	  is	  a	  sad	  enough	  story	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  but	  sadder	  still	  are	  the	  more	  general	  institutional	  pathologies	  this	  episode	  reflects.	  	   The	  first	  is	  the	  FDA's	  paralyzing	  institutional	  memory.	  	  In	  declining	  to	  act	  on	  antibiotics	   in	   animal	   feed,	   the	   FDA	   unreflectively	   repeated	   its	   decades-­‐long	  insistence	   that	   it	   must	   hold	   formal	   evidentiary	   hearings	   before	   withdrawing	  approvals	   for	   animal	   drugs.	   	   The	   agency	   did	   not	   look	   afresh	   at	   the	   procedural	  possibilities,	  short	  of	  formal	  hearings,	  for	  undertaking	  such	  withdrawals.	  	  It	  did	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  21	  C.F.R.	  10.50(b).	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even	  seem	  aware	  of,	  much	  less	  alive	  to,	  the	  developments	  in	  administrative	  law	  that	  made	   its	   insistence	  on	   formal	  hearings	   seem	  so	  woefully	  out	  of	   touch.	   	  Yet,	   at	   the	  same	   time,	   the	   agency	   seemed	   to	   recall	   with	   painful	   clarity	   the	   experience	   of	  actually	   holding	   formal	   hearings	   on	   the	   use	   of	   one	   antibiotic	   (enrofloxacin)	   in	  poultry.	  	  The	  combination	  of	  a	  reflexive	  "we've	  always	  done	  it	  this	  way"	  posture	  as	  to	   the	   legal	   premise	   that	   formal	   hearings	  were	   required,	   and	   a	   searing	   "we	   tried	  doing	   that	   once"	   experience	   with	   such	   hearings,	   all	   but	   guaranteed	   the	   agency's	  immobility	  on	  antibiotics	  in	  animal	  feed.	  	   The	   agency's	   discomfort	   with	  moving	   out	   of	   its	   usual	   procedural	   channels	  was	  matched	  by	  serene	  comfort	  with	  absurdly	  long	  timeframes	  for	  decision	  making.	  	  The	   35-­‐year	   space	   between	   the	   FDA's	   initial	   notices	   of	   hearings	   on	   its	   proposed	  withdrawals	   of	   approval	   of	   certain	   antibiotics	   used	   in	   animal	   feed	   and	   its	  withdrawal	  of	  those	  hearing	  notices	  speaks	  volumes	  about	  the	  agency's	  ease	  with	  a	  slow	  pace.	  	  But	  equally	  telling	  is	  the	  agency's	  insistence,	  even	  after	  the	  district	  court	  had	   chastised	   it	   for	   its	   slowness	   and	   intransigence,	   that	   it	   would	   take	   some	   five	  years	   to	   complete	   the	   process	   of	   withdrawing	   approvals	   of	   penicillin	   and	  tetracyclines	  used	  in	  animal	  feed.117	  	  It	  would,	  the	  agency	  reported	  to	  the	  court,	  take	  the	   agency	   at	   least	   two	  months	   just	   to	   search	   its	   own	   files	   on	   the	   topic.118	   	   And,	  perhaps	  just	  as	  stunningly,	  the	  court	  accepted	  the	  agency's	  timeline.119	  	  	  	   The	   FDA's	   simultaneous	   insistence	   on	   offering,	   and	   aversion	   to	   actually	  undertaking,	   formal	   hearings,	   coupled	   with	   its	   extreme	   insouciance	   about	   delay,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA,	  Memorandum	  and	  Order	  of	  August	  8,	  2012,	  at	  23.	  118	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA,	  Declaration	  of	  William	  T.	  Flynn,	  D.V.M.,	  M.S.,	  at	  5.	  119	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA,	  Memorandum	  and	  Order	  of	  August	  8,	  2012.	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make	  for	  a	  paralyzing	  brew.	  	  Add	  a	  final	  institutional	  factor	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  grant	  of	  authority	  to	  a	  particular	  person	  to	  make	  initial	   findings	  on	  the	  continued	  safety	  of	  approved	  animal	  drugs	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  inaction	  is	  virtually	  assured.	  	   The	   FDCA,	   as	   noted	   above,	   requires	   the	   Secretary	   of	   HHS	   to	   withdraw	  approvals	  for	  an	  animal	  drug	  if	  she	  finds	  that	  new	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  the	  drug	  is	  not	  safe	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  FDCA.	  	  The	  Secretary	  has	  delegated	  this	  authority	  to	   the	   Commissioner	   of	   the	   Food	   and	   Drug	   Administration,120	   who	   has	   in	   turn	  delegated	   authority	   to	   the	   Center	   for	   Veterinary	   Medicine	   to	   issue	   notices	   of	  hearings	  on	  withdrawals	  of	  approval.121	  	  These	  re-­‐delegations	  of	  epistemic	  authority	  themselves	  raise	  questions	  about	  what	  it	  means	  when	  Congress	  grants	  authority	  to	  make	  particular	  factual	  determinations	  to	  particular	  individuals.	   	  But	  even	  without	  the	   re-­‐delegation	  of	  authority,	   the	   fact	  of	  particularized	  delegation	  means	   that	   the	  agency	   can	   insist	   that	   the	   relevant	   factual	   determinations	   be	   made	   only	   by	   the	  holder	  of	  the	  delegated	  authority	  in	  order	  to	  have	  legal	  effect.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  FDA	  has	  resisted	   the	   litigation	   over	   antibiotics	   in	   animal	   feed	   partly	   by	   asserting	   that	   the	  relevant	  factual	  determinations	  have	  not	  been	  made	  by	  the	  right	  person	  within	  the	  agency.122	   	  This	  structure	  makes	  room	  for	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  agency,	  with	  its	  many	   experts,	   can	   continue	   indefinitely	   to	   study	   and	   even	   to	   pronounce	   upon	   a	  factual	  matter	   -­‐-­‐	   such	   as	   the	   link	  between	   feeding	   antibiotics	   to	   food	   animals	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  120	   FDA	   Staff	   Manual	   Guides,	   Volume	   II	   –	   Delegations	   of	   Authority,	   Regulatory	  Delegations	  of	  Authority	  to	  the	  Commissioner	  Food	  and	  Drugs	  §	  1410.10(1)(A)(1).	  available	   	   at	  http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/ucm080711.htm/.	  121	  21	  C.F.R.	  §	  5.84.	  122	  Brief	  for	  Defendants-­‐Appellants,	  NRDC	  v.	  FDA,	  2012	  WL	  4834272,	  at	  29-­‐33	  (2d	  Cir.).	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promoting	   antibiotic	   resistance	   in	   the	   human	   population	   -­‐-­‐	   without	   ever	   facing	   a	  moment	  of	  truth	  in	  which	  it	  must,	  in	  a	  consequential	  way,	  say	  what	  it	  believes.	  	  	  V.	  Conclusion	  	   The	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  has,	   for	  decades,	  put	  off	  acting	  with	  any	  force	  on	  the	  health	  risks	  posed	  by	  administering	  antibiotics	  to	  food	  animals	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  promoting	  growth	  and	  preventing	  infection.	   	  The	  agency’s	  explanation	  has	   been	   that	   the	   Food,	   Drug	   and	   Cosmetic	   Act	   requires	   it	   to	   hold	   time-­‐	   and	  resource-­‐intensive	  formal	  hearings	  before	  it	  can	  withdraw	  approvals	  for	  antibiotics	  used	   for	   these	   purposes.	   	   In	   so	   arguing,	   the	   FDA	   has	   ignored	   decades	   of	  developments	  in	  administrative	  law	  and	  has	  misread	  the	  FDCA	  itself.	   	  The	  FDA	  has	  the	   discretion	   under	   the	   law	   to	   act	   on	   antibiotics	   in	   animal	   feed	   without	   going	  through	  the	  years-­‐long	  process	  of	  formal	  hearings.	  	  At	  the	  least,	  the	  agency	  owes	  the	  public	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	   it	  has	  refused	  to	  pursue	  an	  easier	  path	   to	  protecting	  public	  health.	  	   The	   FDA’s	   legal	   error	   is,	   in	   principle,	   simple	   enough	   to	   correct.	   	   Far	   less	  remediable	   are	   the	   habits	   of	   mind	   that	   entrench	   agency	   inaction,	   including	  institutional	  memory	   that	  privileges	  stasis	  over	  change	  and	  systematic	  acceptance	  of	  absurdly	  long	  timelines	  for	  addressing	  social	  problems.	  	  	  Equally	  immobilizing	  are	  statutory	   grants	   of	   epistemic	   authority	   to	   particular	   individuals	   within	   large	  bureaucratic	   institutions,	   which	   allow	   these	   institutions	   officially	   to	   deny	   certain	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  even	  while	  they	  report	  them	  as	  the	  truth.	  	  	  
